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Resumo
Neste artigo discuto o giro conservador que teve 
lugar na Rússia nos últimos 15 anos, comparando-o 
com a experiência recente da Hungria e da 
Polônia. Mostro que, em grande parte, esta 
reação é de natureza socioeconômica e reflete 
a frustração das pessoas com as desvantagens 
da liberalização econômica. Além disso, a 
profundidade da transformação social original 
determinou a capacidade de uma sociedade 
para resistir à tendência conservadora. Na Rússia, 
onde os processos de modernização eram os mais 
superficiais, as antigas elites políticas podiam 
recuperar o poder mais cedo e reverter a sociedade 
mais profundamente. Também vejo diferentes 
escolas de pensamento conservadoras na Rússia e 
mostro que Putin manipulou essa ideologia para 
fortalecer seu domínio sobre o poder.
Palavras-chave: Conservadorismo, Populismo de 
direita, Eurasianismo, Soberania Democrática
Abstract
In this paper I discuss the conservative turn that 
took place in Russia in the last 15 years comparing 
it to the recent experience of Hungary and Poland. 
I show that to a large extent this backlash is of a 
socioeconomic nature and reflects the people’s 
frustration with the downsides of the economic 
liberalization. Moreover, the depth of the original 
social transformation determined a society’s ability 
to resist to the conservative trend. In Russia  
where the modernization processes were the 
shallowest, the old political elites could regain 
power sooner and roll back the society deeper. 
I also overview different conservative schools of 
thought in Russia and show Putin manipulated 
this ideology to strengthen his hold on power. 
Keywords: conservatism, right populism, 
Eurasianism, sovereign democracy
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Introduction
Since the mid-2010 the Freedom House reports the increasing number of the 
countries in the world experienced a serious decline in political freedoms. Eastern 
Europe is one of the regions with a decline in number of political freedoms in such 
countries as Hungary and Russia. Recently Poland joined the group, following the 
victory of the right-wing party Law and Justice (PiS) in the 2015 parliamentary 
elections.1 A number of disturbing similarities exists between Russia’s recent political 
style, Hungarian and Polish leadership: the use of the Eurosceptic rhetoric (Müller 
2016), illiberal tendencies including the attempts to destroy the system of checks 
and balances (Gostyńska-Jakubowska 2016). There is also an ideological sympathy 
between the leadership of these countries: the links between Vladimir Putin and 
Hungary’s Viktor Orban are known; in 2011 the PiS leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski declared 
that “one day we will see Budapest in Warsaw (Gostyńska-Jakubowska 2016).
Hence though Russia was the first country in the region to embrace this illiberal 
trend, it was not unique. The checks and balances on president’s authority were 
destroyed in the early 2000s after Vladimir Putin accession to power followed by his 
ideological embrace of the conservative trend. Yet, Russia has gone furthest along this 
track: unlike other countries Russia’s system (which was never perfectly democratic) 
has transformed into a full-fledged electoral autocracy. Russia may also be purposefully 
contributing to the illiberal trends in other countries by funding populist parties and 
leaders.2 Yet as I argue Russia’s path is the part of the same trajectory recently followed 
by other countries.
What explains the recent trend in these countries? In this paper I look at the 
explanations for the recent conservative trend in Russia in comparison to Poland and 
Hungary by focusing on the conservative demand and supply side. First, I look at the 
specific social prerequisites that made this illiberal trend possible. Second I analyze the 
specific incentives of the Russian elites that chose to use and manipulate the available 
social preconditions.
Definitions
The term conservatism is often associated to a wide range of ideological positions, 
including traditionalism, orthodoxy, nationalism, paternalism, right-wing politics etc. 
The variation of approaches to conservatism largely depends on the definition used, 
hence it is important to define the issue first.
Different approaches to conservatism can be broadly split into the ideological 
and the situational ones. The ideological approaches (starting with Burke’s critic of the 
French Revolution) are associated to ideological movements that oppose modernism, 
liberalism and/or socialism in an attempt to return to the “good old times” and stress 
the importance of tradition (in the Mannheimian sense) (Mannheim 1953; Bloor 1997). 
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Under this approach, conservatism is understood as initial reaction to the political and 
social change, a reaction which later evolved into a separate ideology, a distinct mode of 
thought, its own independent reflexive doctrine with an emphasize on specific values, 
traditions and institutions (such as importance of the moral order and hierarchy). What 
makes political arguments conservative (contrary to orthodoxy and traditionalism) 
is the critic of progressive and/or liberal arguments using “the enlightened grounds 
of the search for human happiness, based on the use of reason” (Muller 1997).
By contrast, Huntington (1957) understood conservatism as fundamentally a 
positional ideology that emerges as an outcome of distinct historical situations 
when a fundamental challenge to the established institutions forces supporters of 
such institutions to employ the conservative ideology in their defense. Therefore, to 
Huntington conservatism as a set of ideas designed to justify any established social 
order, “no matter where or when it exists, against any fundamental challenge to 
its nature or being, no matter from what quarter rather than an inherent theory in 
defense of particular values or institutions” (Huntington 1957). Under this approach 
conservatism is primarily a set of parallel ideological reactions to similar social 
situations, a passionate affirmation of the value of existing institutions, a defense 
of tradition that exists without tradition, which appears when “challenging and 
defending social groups stand in a particular relation to each other” (Huntington 1957: 
456). In this sense conservatism is highly reactionary in nature, without any unifying 
ideological grounds.
For the purposes of this work I will use Huntington’s situational interpretation 
of conservatism, which will allow me to explain the fundamentally changeable and 
instrumental application of conservatism by the Russian leadership. In my view, the 
conservative turn in Russia represents an attempt by the Russian elites and some 
groups of the Russian society to resist the social transformation that began in the 
late 1980s – early 1990s. In this sense, conservatism in today’s Russia is fundamentally 
instrumental in nature (despite its relies on some philosophical tradition). Such 
approach allows to explain the inconsistency and fragmentation in today’s Russian 
conservative tradition.
Demand Side: Social Fatigue from Transformation
The emergence of a conservative trend in Russia. Hungary and Poland (I label 
them as the “right” due to their active use of the nationalist rhetoric) is alarming. What 
explains similar patterns in the countries as diverse, with distinct national traditions 
and history? In the late 1980s-90s the Eastern European countries were engaged 
in the parallel processes of democratization (from autocracy to democracy) and 
marketization (from planned to market economy).3 The magnitude of these process 
which meant restructuring of the core principles of the organization of the society was 
particularly painful and dramatic for most post-Communist states. 
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The radical transformation of societies usually leads to a reaction. However, the size 
of the reaction depends upon particular structures of respective societies, particularly 
the number and organization of the so-called reforms losers (Hellman 1998). In more 
industrialized countries, which were more integrated in the European markets to begin 
with, the transformation may have provoked less resistance. In more rural societies, 
whose economies were more dependent on the Soviet Union, the reforms led to a 
bigger shock and stronger resistance from certain societal groups.
The concentration of the modernization losers and their respective size, however, 
varied from country to country. Horowitz (2000) who compares the market transitions 
in Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic notes that while the concentrated interest 
groups losing from market reform – particularly heavily subsidized sectors such as 
agriculture and inefficient heavy industry – were largest in Poland and smallest in the 
Czech Republic. In Poland such interest groups were also most well-organized, and 
least well-organized in the Czech Republic. Eventually in both Poland and Hungary 
the agricultural sector and state sector industries were forced to fend for themselves. 
In Hungary the socioeconomic cost of the market reforms for different groups was in 
some respects exaggerated by the gradualist approach chosen by the ruling 
elites (Bartlett. 1997). The outcome of the transition in these two countries was the 
emergence of resentful and a relatively well organized groups, which lost most in the 
result of the transformation and hence were most vulnerable to the populist slogans. 
As result of these structural disparities both Hungary and Poland lost a significant 
amount of employment between the start of transformation and late 1990s (Dallago 
and Rosefielde 2016). Later the less developed eastern and north-eastern regions 
with highest unemployment levels of both countries ended up constituting the main 
support of the populist leaders utilizing the conservative agenda.4
In Russia the reforms turned out even more painful due to structural imbalances 
in different sectors of post-Soviet economy and less significant integration into the 
European markets by the start of the transformation (comparing to Poland and 
Hungary). Russia’s manufacturing sector was particularly uncompetitive internationally 
and oriented toward domestic consumption. Person and Landry (2016) show that as 
people were socialized into the new economic and political system after the Soviet 
collapse, their patterns of political participation were set by the economic conditions 
around them, not just their own individual economic situations and the effect of early 
transition economics turned out to be very durable. The severity of local economic 
shocks in the early 1990s exerted an influence on orientations toward political 
participation nearly 20 years later (Person and Landry 2016). 
One of the common findings in political science that the anti-modernization 
oriented parties tend to rely on so-called “modernization losers” – the groups of the 
population who suffered most from the modernization processes (Loch and Norocel 
2016). Hence the fact that the conservative turn occurred in the countries with larger 
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segments of the population particularly hurt by the modernization doesn’t seem 
random.
The same group of modernization losers constitutes one of the most reliable 
segment of Vladimir Putin’s support – a bureaucratic class, pensioners and state 
employees. In addition, “modernization losers” in Russia are the residents of small, 
medium and single-industry towns (Loch and Norocel 2016) - the so-called “second 
Russia” as described by the sociologist Natalia Zubarevitch, which typically votes for 
Putin, since it appreciates most his policies of creating a strong paternalistic state, 
large-scale social protection, and “the stability, availability of work and wages”. This 
groups also remembers the 1990s best and most likely to reject the liberal ideas. 5 
Similar voters of smaller and middle-size towns of depressed regions in Poland and 
Hungary (traditional, conservative, traditionally oriented regions) historically vote for 
PiS and Fidesz respectively (Berglund 2013). 
In all three countries with the “conservative” trend we observe the same dynamics: 
the larger share of the transformation losers, and a gradual increase of the social 
nostalgia for the pre-reform period precede the arrival of a soon-to-be conservative 
leader. Was the frustration with the reforms spread in those countries prior to the 
arrival of the populist leaders? A ERBD survey of 28 post-socialist countries (Denisova; 
Eller; Frye; and Zhuravskaya 2007) 6 sheds some light on this dynamic. During the 
survey respondents were asked to choose from four possible answers to the question 
of how, in their opinion, their country had to deal with privatized property. The option 
“leave everything unchanged”, which reflects the choice of people truly satisfied with 
the privatization reforms, was chosen by a minority of citizens in each country (with a 
maximum of 45% of respondents in Estonia). In Russia, Poland, and Hungary, however, 
among the lowest numbers in Eastern Europe - 20 and less percent of respondents 
– chose this option. According to a different survey in 2009 (one year prior to Fidesz 
becoming the ruling party in the country) the number of Hungarians who approved 
of the market reforms that took place in the country, was one of the lowest in the 
Eastern Europe.7 In 2013 (two years before PiS won the parliamentary elections) 60% of 
Polish respondents believed that post-Communist transformation came at particularly 
high price for Poland (Karolewski and Benedikter 2016). This suggests that a higher 
dissatisfaction with transition manifested already in the second half of the 2000s. 
The later conservative political turn in these countries was just a logical continuation 
of this trend.  Hence Fidesz and PiS taking power can be interpreted as a certain 
modernization fatigue in these countries.
Putin’s policies in Russia may also be reflective of the accumulated frustration to the 
transformation processes of the 1990s. Prior to Putin’s taking power the social surveys 
of the late 1990s revealed the reforms fatigue of the Russian society. Alexey Levinson, 
a sociologist from Russia’s Levada-Center, points out that by the end of the 1990s “the 
share of those who fully and unconditionally embraced the market reforms was quite 
small. Only later some growth was detected, but it turned out to be quite unstable. 
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Symmetrically, the share of citizens who did not accept the reforms surpassed three 
quarters of the population by the end of Boris Eltsin’s presidency.8 The end of the 1990s 
also marks the peak of Russian’s nostalgia for the Soviet Union – by the year of 2000 
the number of the respondents nostalgic of the Soviet Union reached 75% (the level 
which was not overcome until now, the period of intensified propaganda about the 
“dashing 1990s”).9 Given this dynamics of the public mood one can assume that a 
certain extent of a rollback was to be expected in Russia regardless of what particular 
elite type was to take power in the 2000s. Arguably, however, the Russian elites took it 
to some other extreme due to their own political agenda (see below).
In this sense Polish, Hungarian and Russian trajectory may be part of the common 
process. The accumulated frustration of certain social groups with the results of the 
political and economic transition in the early 1990s, created some demand for a more 
anti-liberal conservative change in the Eastern European societies. The respective size 
of those groups may reflect the timing when the conservative political agenda began 
to be implemented by the politicians (more anti-modernization oriented groups in 
Russia determined an earlier rollback). Transformation losers, groups of population 
particularly hurt by the economic transitions, more susceptible to the populist anti-
liberal rhetoric, were coopted by the political leaders under the conservative rhetoric. 
This is partly pronounced through the common reference to the allegedly bad 
experiences of the 1990s, the so-called “dashing 1990s” (Pomerantsev 10 by the Putin 
elites; and in the anti-liberal rhetoric of Victor Orban and Jaroslav Katchinsky. The 
rejection of the devastating liberalism is complemented by the promises of higher role 
of state in the economy, increased social protection and redistribution to compensate 
for the “unfairness” of the neoliberal period.
The political elites of these countries provide a similar response to a similar social 
demand. From the ideological perspective it means some combination of nationalism, 
Euroscepticism and accent on the country’s own “unique path”. The emphasis on the 
unique values and traditions of a given country by the respective political leaders 
comes along with an increasing rhetorical aversion towards the broadly defined 
“west” (particularly the European Union, or the United States or both). The reform 
fatigue accompanied by the rising discontent against the so-called “west”, because the 
western countries and institutions (IMF, World Bank, western NGOs etc.) are blamed 
for imposing the “alien western traditions” that are incompatible with the cultural 
authenticity of the countries in question.
Hence the recent strengthening of the conservative trend among the countries of 
the Eastern Europe largely represents a reaction to the painful transformation processes 
of the 1990s, and politicization of this agenda by the political elites. To respond to the 
existing social demand for more protection against the market and frustration with 
democracy, the conservative political leaders propose higher redistribution and other 
populist economic policies accompanied by nationalization of major rent-generating 
industries (oil and gas in the Russian case). 
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The similar conservative trend currently experienced in three countries is due 
to the comparable social dynamics undergone by Russia, Poland and Hungary. Yet 
specific response and formulation of conservative ideas is unique to each country, 
and has to do with the situational (in Huntington’s sense) nature of this response. As 
discussed above, rather than being a distinct ideology conservatism is usually used by 
the political elites in an attempt to protect certain institutions in light of the disruptive 
social changes, and ultimately to retain their hold on power.
The Supply Side: The Response of the Elites
Due to the dual nature of the transition in Eastern Europe frustration with the 
economic reforms spread over the attitudes of the population towards the political 
institutions and democracy as well. The skepticism about the functioning of democratic 
system and the economic development of these countries was politicized and used by 
the ruling elites to achieve their political goals.
This is why the conservative political elites usually combine the emphasize on a 
country’s “unique path” with rejection of political liberalism of the western European 
type. The malfunctioning western-type democracy was counteres with the “sovereign 
democracy” in the Russian case, or the “illiberal democracy” in Hungarian case (Simon 
2014). Together with anti-democratic rhetoric the leadership in these countries took 
specific actions to enhance the role of the executive authorities, destroy checks and 
balances and contain independent institutions. 
The dual nature of the political transformation influenced the fact that the market 
reforms are perceived in these countries as the “integration in the west” and often 
guided by the western institutions (the IMF, World Bank). Hence, the reaction to those 
processes also combines anti-market and anti-democratic trends with Euroscepticism. 
This also to a large extent explains the anti-western rhetoric by the Russian elites and 
Euroscepticism of the Hungarian and Polish elites. 
At the same time, in most cases the political elites attempted to come up or 
reemphasize their own “traditional values” contrasted to the “western values”. However, 
the cultural specificity of each country adjust the specific way in which conservatism, 
traditional values and institutions are understood. In Polish case this is a pre-Communist 
Polish conservatism, emphasis on the Catholic church and traditional family values. In 
Hungary – traditional “European” values of a nation, family and religion.11 In Russia’s 
case the authorities are attempting to combine some sort of a “traditional” hybrid from 
the combination of the ideological elements of the Russian empire, Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Soviet Union (a Russian world combined with post-Soviet revanchism 
and Eastern Orthodoxy). Below I focus more specifically on the conservative brand 
which was elaborated and implemented in Russia.
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Historical Evolution of the Russian Conservatism
The contemporary Kremlin’s conservatism was for the first time officially 
announced in 2009 when the ruling United Russia party that passed a document that 
specified “Russia’s conservatism” as its official ideology.12 However, the general trend 
towards embracing these values started at least since Putin taking power in 2000. 
The historical evolution of the conservative tradition in Russia proves the initial 
approach of this paper to conservatism as fundamentally a reaction to massive 
societal changes. The initial conservative tradition evolved in the Russian Empire as 
reaction to the French Revolution of the late 18th century. Writings of the early Russian 
conservatives – Slavophiles (Alexey Khomyakov, Ivan Kireyevsky, Iury Samarin, Ivan and 
Konstantin Aksakov) of the first half of 19th century were focused on the importance 
of preservation of the unique Russian values (particularly religion) and largely had a 
romantic orientation topical of the time.13 
During the first half of the 19th century Russia faced social and national unrest, 
which led to the Decembrist revolt in St Petersburg in 1825, in which tsarist officers 
staged a rebellion asking to introduce a constitutional monarchy in Russia. Abroad 
the Polish population in the western provinces of Russia staged a rebellion in 1831. 
To strengthen the authority of the tsar Nicholas I’s education minister Sergey Uvarov 
came up in 1833 the idea of the “official nationality” of the Russian empire combining 
a triad of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality” (later used by the Kremlin at the first 
part of Putin’s rule, which added a more mythological aspect to the Slavophile ideas 
and “appealed to the system’s core constituencies – Orthodox Russians and the rural 
peasant population – to rally around the tsar” (Hill and Gaddy 2013).
 The liberal reforms of the 1860s by the Tsar Alexander II (including the long-
awaited abolition of serfdom) gave rise to another type of Russian conservatives – the 
so-called statesmen (Konstantin Pobedonostsev, Lev Tikhomirov) who emphasized 
the fundamental role of the state in the Russian tradition. Nikolay Danilevsky became 
famous in 1869-71 following the publication of his milestone work “Rossia I Evropa”, in 
which he developed a theory of cultural-historical types arguing that Slavic ethos and 
Russia formed a new cultural unit. 
Since its origin the Russian conservatism emerged as a philosophical movement 
challenging both democratic and socialist doctrines, appealing for the authorities 
to avoid the radical change of the social relationships and enforce tradition on the 
basis of monarchy and Eastern Orthodoxy. It particularly strengthened following 
the murder of Russia’s liberal reformer tsar Alexander II (which seemed to confirm 
the conservative ideas that the liberal reforms were unfit for Russia and only could 
only provoke the chaos and disintegration of the country). Another common topic of 
Russia’s conservatism at the time is the western threat to Russian tradition and political 
independence, and the inapplicability of the European forms of governance for the 
unique Russian culture.
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The second wave of conservatism emerged in the emigrant circles as a result 
to the 1917 Revolution in Russia and a radical transformation of the society. Three 
major subgroups constituted the emigrant thought – the works by Ivan Ilyin, the 
works by Ivan Solonevich and the Eurasians (Piotr Savitsky, Nikolay Trubetskoy, 
George Vernadsky, George Florovsky, Lev Karsavin and others). Ivan Ilyin argues 
that the particular forms of organization and functioning of the state is impossible 
to understand without understanding the “unique soul” of every nation. Hence to 
Ilyin different state forms belong to different nations and it’s ridiculous to expect 
the democratic form of governance to belong to each and every country ignoring 
their traditions and culture. A free democratic form of governance is only applicable 
to a mature developed rule-abiding nation, otherwise it may destroy a society. Ilyin 
is particularly focused on Russia’s messianic role in world history, preservation and 
restoration of Russia’s historical borders and Orthodoxy, and its protection from the 
aggression from the western countries that aim to “partition”14 it. 
Ivan Solonevich (1891-1953) focused on the idea of people’s monarchy – unique 
features of the national spirit, history and geography shape particular political 
institutions in every nation. Hence Russia’s nationhood, statehood and culture 
are fundamentally different from Europe and Asia, and create the original Russia’s 
nationalism along with Russian monarchy, church and nation. To Solonevich the loss of 
Russia’s unique national and state traditions led to the disaster – the Revolution of 1917. 
Eurasians, who largely drew from the earlier works of Slavophiles, focused on 
Russia’s imperial ambitions of dominating the center of the Eurasian geographical 
continent. This is why Eurasians were the only ones among the Russian emigres to 
embrace the establishment of the Soviet system, which augmented Russia’s power 
and territory, and could ultimately transform into a Eurasian power. They also stressed 
the origin of the 1917 Revolution as a result of a split between the Russian society 
and the elites, and the loss of the cultural idea of  nation-state. In their view, socialism 
provided a release for the accumulated social discontent. Hence Eurasians view the 
victory of Bolsheviks as some historical necessity, and even historical justice.
The third wave of conservatism emerged as an ideological reaction to the 
transformation and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and the 
liberal political and economic reforms of the early 1990s. Due to the country’s repeatedly 
interrupted philosophical tradition, the third wave of the conservatism combined 
incongruent blurred and eclectic ideas and movements with a focus on the idea of 
the unchanging, eternal values of Russia. To a large extent this trend was a reaction 
of some groups of the Russian society to the loss of the “ancient” Soviet order, their 
concern for stability, preservation of tradition, and aversion to the anarchy. Since the 
emergence of the third wave conservatism this movement opposed Russia’s liberals, 
and embraced instead the values of anti-individualism, collectivism, anti-westernism 
and anti-globalism. The most prominent representatives of the “third wave” of 
conservatism include writers Valentin Rasputin, Alexander Prokhanov, Vadim Kozhin, 
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Alexander Solzhenitsyn, mathematician Ilya Shafarevich, philosophers Alexander 
Zinoviev, publicist Sergey Kara-Murza, a number of Russian Orthodox priests. A school 
of neo-Eurasianists, included theorists such as Elgiz Pozdnykov, Alexander Dugin, 
Natalya Narochnitskaya and Alexander Panarin. As pointed out by Marlene Laruelle, 
since early 1990s the neo-Eurasianists were primarily looking to compensate for the 
Soviet collapse, offering a way of thinking about the suddenly fragmented post-Soviet 
space as a unity without referencing Communism (Laruelle 2015). However, the work 
of scholars like Alexander Solzhenitsyn was particularly focused on pre-Soviet Russia, 
the preservation of the traditions of the Russian Empire. Others put special emphasis 
on the works of the philosophers of the past, including Ivan Ilyin, and Ivan Solonevich 
among the most cited authors. 
In light of the dual democratic and market transition of Russia in the early 1990s, 
the third wave conservatives focus on the critic of the western political structures and 
democracy, discuss the threats the imposition of the western model represents for the 
Russian nation. To the extent that Russia in these theories is portrayed as being under 
some kind of threat from exploitation by the western countries, these ideas remind 
of the Latin American dependency theory. According to contemporary conservatives 
the imposition of the western political and economic model benefits the western 
proprietors of the “financial mechanism” that operates the total dictatorship in the 
west and aims to subordinate the rest of the world. Another common narrative is the 
fundamental role of the Eastern Orthodox tradition for formation of the unique Russian 
statehood, economy and spirit. Hence this branch of thought is eagerly opposed to 
the western religious proselytism, promotion of non-traditional religious cults. Often 
brought up is the Eurasian idea of the exclusivity of a “Slavo-Turkic” super-ethnos 
which allegedly lives in the geopolitical space of Eurasia and spiritually surpasses the 
west that have exhausted its potential by now. In general, the emphasis on Russia’s 
cultural opposition to the west and the inevitable soon collapse of eth United States15 
is particularly strong among the new conservatives. Alexander Dugin writes about a 
constitutive cleavage of Atlanticism/Eurasianism, which divides Europe into the pro-
American Atlanticist group and the Eurasian Heartland. Alexander Prokhanov and 
Mikhail Yuriev emphasize on need for the restoration of the Russia’s empire, which 
could also include other territories along with the post-Soviet space.
Putin’s Application of the Russian Conservatism
It is unclear to what extent Vladimir Putin’s thinking was influenced by conservative 
ideas upon his becoming the President of Russia for the first time. By various accounts 
he was not alien to such lines of thought. During the years of his KGB training Putin 
was likely exposed to the conservative thinkers, such as Eurasians popular in Russia’s 
security circles even in the Soviet period.16 Putin may have also come under the 
influence of the Russian émigré circles in Germany during his residence there, in 
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particular the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists, where Putin could have been 
exposed to the ideas of Russia’s conservative thinkers.
The influence of conservatism on Putin’s thinking, however, was straightforward 
almost immediately after Putin’s coming to power. As early as in his 1999 policy 
manifesto “Russia at the Millennium” Putin proposed ‘grounding’ or ‘domesticating’ 
substantive principles of the liberal ideology for the purposes of arriving at a (typically 
conservative) ‘organic synthesis’ (Prozorov 2004): “We can hope for the future if we can 
organically synthesize the universal principles of market economy and democracy with 
the Russian reality”(Putin 1999). In his article Putin stressed that universal norms of 
democracy were not Russian and have even damaged Russia’s political development. 
Putin also immediately openly reembraced Russian Orthodoxy and the Orthodox 
Church”, stressing “the importance of rediscovering his Orthodox faith”(Hill and Gaddy 
2013). Putin’s interest in Ilyin and his writings became apparent since 2005 through 
Putin’s continuing references to Ilyin in his national addresses in 2005, 2006, and 2007. 
In 2005 Ilyin’s remains were reburied at the necropolis of Donetsk monastery (the 
decision unlikely to have been made without the President’s participation).
Yet initially the conservative trend wasn’t as pronounced largely due to existence 
of liberal groups, legacy of the presidency of Boris Yeltsin within Putin’s closest circles. 
Several most influential ideological schools in Russia influenced the policy-making 
following the collapse of the USSR (Zevelev 2014). Initially the liberal westernizers 
under Boris Yeltsin’s rule made most foreign policy decisions. However, by the end-
1990s their influence diminished and made way for the realist-statists. Founded by 
Yevgeny Primakov, the realist-statists is the group who became disappointed with 
the western approach to Russia in the 1990s (in light of Kosovo bombings and NATO’s 
eastern expansion) and may be described as part of the Russian conservative tradition. 
These are defensive realists who support restoring Russia’s status as an influential 
global player in a multipolar world, strengthening its spheres of influence in the post-
Soviet space and reducing the U.S. global dominance. Russian statists consecutively 
accumulated power during the first years of Putin’s rule. Mid-2000s, when Putin was 
finally able to get rid of the most influential liberal players from Yeltsin times, coincide 
with the increasing influence of the Russian statists in the Kremlin, who sought to secure 
Russia’s full sovereignty by blocking foreign attempts to interfere in Russia’s internal 
affairs from the U.S. seen as promoter of regime change and “colored revolutions” 
(Hill and Gaddy 2013) by increasing Russia’s influence abroad initially through soft-
power approaches.
Around 2007 the Kremlin, increasingly disappointed with the west and more and 
more influenced by the realist-statist thinking, launched a new initiative, designed to 
promote abroad Russia’s soft-power and values that would challenge the standard 
Western tradition. The initiative was to be achieved through several instruments 
created by the Kremlin. First, the state’s control of the country’s major television 
networks and launching new media networks abroad (Russia Today was launched in 
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2005), which would spread a uniform Russia’s interpretation of the events at foreign 
audiences. Second, several newly launched NGOs would familiarize the foreign 
expert communities with the Russia’s culture and policies, such as the Russian World 
Foundation launched in 2007 and designed to spread the Russian language and 
culture under the supervision of a conservative political scientist Vyacheslav Nikonov, 
or the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation with offices in New York and Paris, 
headed by conservative politician Natalia Narochnitskaya.
In the domestic politics the process culminated  in the reformulation of Uvarov’s 
doctrine as “sovereign democracy” – a term first championed by Deputy Chief of 
Staff Vladimir Surkov, as a response to the increasing western concerns regarding 
human right violations in Russia. The idea of sovereign democracy stresses Russia’s 
independence of the west, and communicates the idea of Russia’s strong and powerful 
state with some references to the tsarist autocracy (Hill and Gaddy 2013). Putin’s 
continuous emphasis on the historical role of the Russian Orthodox Church for the 
country fit in that picture. In 2006 Russia’s first deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov 
published an article elaborating that idea. While in line with Russia’s conservative 
tradition he presented the current world as a competition between different value 
systems, Ivanov specifically drew on Count Sergei Uvarov’s famous triad of “Orthodoxy, 
Autocracy, Nationality” (Aslund 2008) to argue that the “new triad of Russian national 
values is sovereign democracy, strong economy, and military power” (Ivanov 2006).
With President Medvedev in 2009-2011 Russian liberal school became slightly 
more noticeable again. Yet the fundamental change in the doctrine came with Putin’s 
third term in 2012, yet again as a reaction to the big societal changes. The 2011-
2012 street protests once again indicated the failure of the liberal approach: the 
Kremlin’s concerns about the west trying to create a Color revolution in Russia along 
with a decision to contain the liberal protest resulted in a fundamental change of 
the approach. Most of the 2000s despite occasional flirting with different ideologies 
(Vladislav Surkov’s attempts to elaborate the concept of the national idea and a 
“sovereign democracy”), the Kremlin avoided integrating specific ideological policies 
into its domestic policies: there was little need for it, since the majority of the Russians 
were satisfied with the economic growth and increasing opportunities. Yet the 2008 
crisis and resulting growth decline has created the increasing people’s frustration 
with the country’s direction, which together with a shock from Putin’s announcement 
about his return to power in September 2011 and unprecedented falsifications of 
the 2011 election contributed to the outburst of protest at the end of the year.17 The 
Kremlin felt threatened. In light of the presidential elections upcoming in May 2012, 
the Kremlin used the available conservative ideas to create with a more coherent and 
pronounced state ideology to justify its tougher anti-wester stance and prosecution of 
the dissent. Shortly after the protests escalated in December 2011 in light of the rigged 
parliamentary elections and the ruling United Russia received one of its worst results in 
history, Vyatcheslav Volodin replaced Vlasislav Surkov at the position of the first deputy 
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chief of President Vladimir Putin’s staff. The first deputy chief of staff is responsible for 
managing the internal affairs and known as “the Kremlin’s political strategist”. Volodin 
replaced Surkov’s flirting with conservative ideas into a blunt but effective promotion 
of conservatism on all levels. It is at this point that the Kremlin implemented a more 
radical conservative shift of its domestic and foreign policies.
The new approach had two goals: contain the domestic protest and substitute 
the state legitimacy previously ensured by continuous economic growth with a new 
legitimacy coming from the conservative ideology; counteract the alleged western 
attempts to change the regime with ensuring Putin’s hold on power. The promotion of 
conservative ideology began to be implemented on a larger scale. On the government 
level, the Kremlin by offering volumes of Russian conservative philosophers to the 
regional governors and other policy-makers in Russia and organized a series of the 
educative seminars on Russian conservative thought in the Kremlin. In January 2013 
mandatory teaching of religion in public schools was introduced in Russia.
The change is quite clearly pronounced in a set of Putin’s own pre-electoral articles 
published prior to 2012 presidential election, where he specifically outlines such 
components of the new conservative trend as the importance of Russia’s distinctive 
civilization, honor, values and spiritualty, and a need to resist the outside attempts to 
destroy Russia’s traditional cultural and political track. In these articles Putin actively 
quotes from Ilyin and Berdiaev, and emphasizes Russia’s cultural distinctiveness: “This 
is what Ivan Ilyin wrote about Russia’s special character: “The core, the fabric of this 
great civilization are the Russian people, the Russian culture. It is this core that different 
provocateurs and our opponents try to destroy while discussing “the Russians’ right to 
self-determination”.18 The distinctiveness of Russia is used to justify the inapplicability 
of the western political institutions (aka democracy, power alternation), and ultimately 
Putin’s stay in power.
When it comes to the international politics, Putin’s articles echo Ilyin’s speculations 
on the attempts by the western powers and NATO to undermine Russia’s sovereignty. 
“Regional and local wars flash before our eyes. There emerge new areas of instability 
and artificially heated, controlled chaos. Deliberate attempts are made to provoke 
such conflicts in the immediate vicinity of Russia’s borders and allies.”19 Now compare 
that quote to Ivan Ilyin’s quote: “Lets immediately accept that Russia’s partitioning 
prepared by the international backstage has absolutely no reason behind, or real 
spiritual or political considerations besides revolutionary demagogy, absurd fear of a 
unified Russia and inveterate enmity towards the Russian monarchy and the Eastern 
Orthodoxy. We know that Western nations don’t understand and don’t tolerate Russian 
identity… They are going to divide the united Russian ‘broom’ into twigs to break 
these twigs one by one and rekindle with them the fading light of their civilization. 
They need to partition Russia to equate it with the West, and thus destroy it: a plan of 
hatred and lust for power …”20 .
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On the policy level Putin’s return in 2012 and appointment of Volodin at the 
position of the internal strategist coincided with a harsh attack against the “western” 
NGOs, independent non-profits and media outlets, perceived as “the agents of the 
foreign influence” with an ultimate goal of destroying the regime. In July 2012 Russia’s 
State Duma (known to be passing the laws crafted in the presidential Administration) 
passed a Foreign Agents law, which obliges the non-profit organizations that receive 
foreign donations and engage in “political activity” to register and declare themselves 
as foreign agents. 2011 also marked the launch of the Eurasian Union project, which 
Putin advertised as the project aimed at reintegrating the post-Soviet space under 
its leadership is Russia’s “natural” geopolitical destiny; but also engage in criticism 
of liberal principles and call on Europe to remember its “true” (conservative) values 
(Laruelle 2015). Marlene Laruelle stresses that this project accelerated the previous 
trend of rehabilitating Russia’s Soviet and imperial past, in the hope that citizens’ 
pride in their country and its legacy would be replicated as support for the regime 
(Laruelle 2015).
Yet the ultimate affirmation of the conservative trend came in 2014 following 
the Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine. The events in Ukraine scared the Kremlin, as a 
direct indicator of the threat of the Color revolutions approaching the Russian borders. 
The decision to annex Crimea, gave the Kremlin a pretext for (using Zevelev’s terms) 
a “securitization of the national identity” (Zevelev 2014). While Russian conservatism 
always had an element of Russia’s imperialism in it, the specific incorporation of these 
ideas into the Kremlin policy-making did not take place until mid-2010s. Until the 
Russian-Ukrainian war the discussions of the new Russian national identity were not 
integrated into Russia’s foreign policy. The revolution in Ukraine allowed (and from the 
Kremlin’s perspective even forced) Russia to securitize the question of identity; that is, 
to make it one of the issues critical for the survival of the Russian nation and statehood.
In March 2014, Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov called the Russian President a 
guarantor of security for the Russian world (Russkyi Mir). From now on the concept of the 
Russkyi Mir was reinterpreted not just a popularization of Russia’s culture and language, 
but as the shift from the nation-state level to the larger than as nation-state community 
becomes. This change in the Kremlin’s official perception of its zones of responsibility 
justified the annexation of Crimea, war in Ukraine and became very pronounced on the 
policy level. The Ukrainian events coincided with the strengthening of the positions 
in the Kremlin policy-making circles (dominated by the realist-statesmen at the time) 
of the group of neo-imperialist (including the neo-Eurasian Alexander Dugin), who 
emphasized the need to reestablish the Russia’s positions in the world and to create 
a buffer zone of post-Soviet protectorates along Russia’s new borders (Zevelev 2014). 
The Russian world concept, which integrated the neo-Eurasianist concepts, pictured 
Russia as not limited by its national borders, as a certain hybrid of a Russian empire and 
a Soviet Union. Around the same time the Kremlin also coined the term “Novorossia” 
to describe the allegedly Russians-populated territories located outside of the national 
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Russian borders in Ukraine (the term itself is a completely artificial construct created for 
purely instrumental reasons21).
Mikhail Yuriev’s book was rumored to be very popular in Putin’s close circles 
around that time, pictures this neo-imperial image of Russia. In a utopian fantasy 
“The Third Empire: Russia that Ought to Be” Yuriev describes how 2054 world order 
was established, and the process has a striking resemblance with the 2014 Ukrainian 
events. It begins with a Recovery period of 2000-12, when the Great Russia starts its 
resurgence under the rule of Vladimir II the Restorer. Importantly the First Expansion 
that leads to reunification of significant territory occurs when Eastern and Southern 
Ukrainian regions rebel against west-organized Orange revolution (supported by 
western Ukraine). To help the revolting Ukrainians (that want to rejoin Russia) Vladimir 
II offers to include their Eastern territories into Russia. He then passes a referendum 
on those territories, and replaces the Russian Federation with the Russian Union 
(refer to the Custom Union) that also includes Belarus, Prednestrovie, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Yuriev’s book was published in 2006 (prior 
to the Georgian war and the de-facto annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia) 
weirdly predicted the events that followed, which suggests that it had a good grasp 
on the thinking in the Kremlin policy-making circles (Snegovaya 2014).
Although the Russkyi Mir concept along with the collapse of the Novorossia project 
eventually failed and is currently put on hold, it had a serious impact on the evolution of 
the conservative trends in Russia. The war in Ukraine coincided in tougher prosecution 
of any dissent and opposition in Russia portrayed by the state propaganda as the 
western accomplices aiming to destroy the country, increase in state propaganda 
levels on the main state-controlled TV channels, and the emergence of a group of 
ultra-conservative Russian deputies (including Irina Yarovaya, Elena Miszulina, Vitaly 
Milonov) with a set of anti-liberal bills, many of them became laws. These legislatve 
initiatives included among others Milonov’s controversial legislation banning the 
vaguely defined “promotion of non-traditional sexual relations”; Mizulina’s 2012 
Internet Restriction Bill; 2013 Anti-Magnitsky bill denying Americans the right to adopt 
Russian children; 2013 prohibits the distribution of “propaganda of nontraditional 
sexual relations; 2014 bill preventing women from entering higher education before 
giving birth; Yarovaya’s laws imposing harsh new restrictions on religious groups and 
internet providers etc.) 
Generally, domestically such policies have been a success. The use of the 
conservative ideology and annexation of Crimea bumped up Putin’s ratings, Portraying 
the Russian opposition leaders as west-funded traitors destroyed the popular support 
for the opposition, which culminated in its complete failure to win any legislative seats 
in the last parliamentary elections in September 2016. The new Duma elected in 2016 
featuresan even larger group of ultra-conservative politicians, including a TV host 
Peter Tolstoy, a Stalin-admirer Elena Yampolskaya, a writer Sergei Shargunov, which 
suggests that the conservative track in Russia’s domestic policies will continue.
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However, it is unclear to what extent the foreign policy of the Kremlin has been a 
success as well. Through aggressive rhetoric and anti-western stance in Ukraine and 
Syria Putin disrupted the relationships with the west, while the western sanctions on 
Russia damaged Russia’s economy, which represents a risk for Putin’s rule in the future. 
Yet until recently the confrontation with the west allowed him to position himself 
as a strong leader in the eyes of the Russian people, hence providing a boost to his 
popularity. If the ultimate goal of conservatism is to preserve existing institutions and 
the elites hold on power, so far the goal was achieved.
Conclusion
In this paper I discuss the conservative turn that took place in Russia in the last 15 
years. I provide the bottom-up and the top-down explanations to this phenomenon. 
Russian dynamics does not look that surprising and unique when compared with 
similar trajectories of other Eastern European countries. Such conservative reaction 
looks like an expected response to the political and economic transitions the post-
Communist societies underwent in the 1990s. Some Latin American countries 
(primarily, the Andes – Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela) went through a similar process 
of the so-called Crisis of Democratic Representation following the implementation 
of neoliberal economic and political reforms in the 1980s due to similar causes 
(Mainwaring; Bejarano; and Leongómez 2006).
However, the reactionary response in all three countries of interest started in 
different period (in Russia before all) and had a similarly varied depth of socio-political 
reaction. The extent of the reaction (and its chance to roll back into a non-democratic 
system) likely is partly defined by the depth of the original transformation of the society. 
Poland, among the most modernized of the analyzed cases, the rollback process has 
just started, and will likely be the least profound (as recently illustrated by successful 
popular ban on the abortion law). By contrast, in Russia where the modernization 
processes were the most superficial and faced the strongest social resistance, the old 
political elites could regain power sooner and roll back the society deeper. The hope 
remains that along with other countries at similar development stages Russia will be 
able to return to modernization track.
111v.5, n.1, p.95-113, 2017
Political Conservatism in Russia
Notes 
1 Rightwing Law and Justice Party Wins Election. Guardian, October 27, 2015. http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2015/oct/27/poland-law-justice-party-wins-235-seats-can-govern-alone
2  http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/PC_Study_Russian_Influence_Slovakia_ENG.pdf; 
Marlene Laruelle Lóránt Győri Péter Krekó Dóra Haller Rudy Reichstadt “From Paris To Vladivostok”. The 
Kremlin connections of the French far-right.// http://www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/PC_
Study_Russian_Influence_France_ENG.pdf; Marching Towards Eurasia. The Kremlin connections of the 
Slovak far-right Péter Krekó Lóránt Győri Daniel Milo Juraj Marušiak János Széky Anita Lencsés// http://
www.politicalcapital.hu/wp-content/uploads/PC_Study_Russian_Influence_Slovakia_ENG.pdf
3 In fact the transition also involved a separate process of nation state-building, which I omit for the 
purposes of this paper. /
4 Снеговая М. Правый пововрот: такой ли уж особый у России путь?  28 апрел, 2016// http://www.
rbc.ru/opinions/politics/28/04/2016/5721f97b9a79471753dacefc
5 Наталья Зубаревич. Четыре России и новая политическая реальность. Polit.ru,  17 января 2016// 
http://polit.ru/article/2016/01/17/four_russians/
6 Ростислав Капеллюшниклов. Собственность без легитимности? 27 марта 2008, polit.ru// http://
polit.ru/article/2008/03/27/sobstv/
7 End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations. Pew Research Center, November 2, 
2009// http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/end-of-communism-cheered-but-now-with-more-
reservations/
8 Левинсон А.Г. Общественное мнение о реформах начала 1990-х годов. История новой России, 
http://www.ru-90.ru/node/1129
9 Почему почти 60 процентов россиян «глубоко сожалеет» о распаде СССР. Иносми, 24.12.2009// 
http://inosmi.ru/social/20091224/157182941.html
10 Peter Pomerantsev: Putin is a media fiction. He is the first president entirely created through media. 
(Mymedia, 25.09.2015)// http://mymedia.org.ua/en/articles/media/pomerantsev_presentatsiya_knigi.
html
11 Orbán, in UK speech, calls for return to traditional European value. Politics.hu, October 10th, 2013
//http://www.politics.hu/20131010/orban-calls-for-traditional-values-to-meet-modern-challenges/
12  “Российский консерватизм” стал официальной идеологией “Единой России”. (RIA новости, 
21.11.2009)// https://ria.ru/politics/20091121/194856090.html
13 А.В. Репников. Консервативная модель переустройства России. Доклад на научном семинаре 
«Россия в условиях трансформаций». См.:Вестник Фонда развития политического центризма, 
июнь 2000, № 2 (23). Россия в условиях трансформаций. Историко-политологический семинар. 
Материалы. Вып. 2. М., 2000. С.4-28.
14 Ivan Ilyin’s 1950 piece ‘What Does Russia’s Partitioning Mean to the World?
15 Александр Дугин. Основы геополитики. Москва, Арктогея,2000// http://arctogaia.com/public/
osnovygeo/geop4-7.htm
16 История России XX век. Эпоха сталинизма (1923–1953), том II, под ред.А.Б.Зубова.- Москва, 
Издатеоьство «Э». 2016
17 Волков Д. Лекция «Основания политического порядка и возможность демократических перемен 
в России», 01 ноября 2015 (прочитанна 19 февраля 2015 в рамках Открытого гражданского лектория 
Сахаровского центра), http://polit.ru/article/2015/11/01/foundation/
18 Владимир Путин. “Россия: национальный вопрос” (Незавиимая газета, 23.01.2012)
19 Владимир Путин. «Быть сильными: гарантии национальной безопасности для России» (Российская 
газета, 20.02.2012)
20 Ivan Ilyin: ‘What Does Russia’s Partitioning Mean to the World?’, “Our Tasks”,1950
21 http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2014/05/19/sozdanie-novoj-politicheskoj-realnosti
112 Desenvolvimento em Debate
Maria Snegovaya
References
Aslund, A. (2008) Putin’s Lurch toward Tsarism and Neoimperialism: Why the United 
States Should Care. Demokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 
16(1):17-25·December, https://www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20
archive/ GWASHU_DEMO_16_1/2T54R87451R1217G/2T54R87451R1217G.pdf
BArtlett, dAvid (1997). The Political Economy of Dual Transformation. Market Reform and 
Democratization in Hungary. The University of Michigan
Berglund, sten (ed) (2013) The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Edward 
Elgar Publishing Inc., - P.196
Bloor, d. (1997) ‘The Conservative Constructivist’ History of the Human Sciences, 123–5.
denisovA, irinA; MArkus eller; tiMothy Frye; and ekAterinA ZhurAvskAyA (2007) 
“Who Wants to Revise Privatization and Why? Evidence From 28 Post-Communist Countries”. 
CEFIR and NES Working Papers. n 105
gostyńskA-JAkuBowskA, AgAtA (2016) Poland: Europe’s new enfant terrible? Bulletin 
Article by Center for European Reform, 22 January 2016// https://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/
files/bulletin_106_ag_article1.pdf
hellMAn, J.s (1998) Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform. World Politics, Volume 50, 
Issue 2
hill, F And gAddy C (2013) Mr Putin : Operative in the Kremlin. The Brookings Institution
howoritZ, s. (2000) National Identity and Liberalizing Consensus in Poland, Hungary and The 
Czech Republic. The Polish Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, pp. 197-216
huntington, sAMuel P (1957) Conservatism as an Ideology. The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jun), pp. 454-473//  https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1952202.pdf
ivAnov, sergei (2006) “Triada natsionalnykh tsennostei” [The triad of national values], 
Izvestiya, July 13, 2006. Available at http://www.izvestia.ru/politic/article3094592/(accessed 
January 10, 2008).
kArolewski, ireneusZ And rolAnd Benedikter (2016) Is Poland Really Lost? Poland’s 
Contested Governance Reforms and the further Role of the Central Eastern European area 
(CEE) in the EU, Working Paper for The Europe Center, Freeman Spogli Institute for International 
Studies, Stanford University, https://fsi.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/poland-cee-and-eu-
karolewski-benedikter-2016-final3.pdf
lAruelle, M. (2015) Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasian Union TERMINOLOGICAL GAPS AND 
OVERLAPS PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 366, July,  http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/
default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm366_Laruelle_July2015.pdf
loCh, dietMAr And CristiAn noroCel (2016). The Populist Radical Right in Europe A 
Xenophobic Voice in the Global Economic Crisis, Europe’s Prolonged Crisis: The Making or 
the Unmaking of a Political Union (Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology, Palgrave 
Macmillan; 1st ed. 2015 edition (April 29, 2016)
MAinwAring, sCott; AnA MAríA BeJArAno; And eduArdo leongóMeZ eds (2006) 
The Crisis of Democratic Representation In The Andes, Stanford, California, Stanford University 
Press
MAnnheiM, kArl (1953) “Conservative Thought,” Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology, 
ed. Paul Kecskemeti (New York, 1953), pp. 98-99.
Müller, JAn-werner (2016) The Problem with Poland. The New York Review of Books, http://
www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/02/11/kaczynski-eu-problem-with-poland/
113v.5, n.1, p.95-113, 2017
Political Conservatism in Russia
Muller, Jerry. (Ed) (1997) Conservatism: An Anthology of Social and Political Thought from 
David Hume to the Present. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey,  – p.5
oFFe, ClAus (1991). Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple 
Transition in East Central Europe. Social Research, 58(4), p.865-881. January, pp. 203-234
Person, roBert and Pierre lAndry (2016) The Political Consequences of Economic Shocks, 
Problems of Post-Communism, 63:4, 221-240
orBán, in uk speech, calls for return to traditional european value. Politics.hu, October 10th, 
2013. //http://www.politics.hu/20131010/orban-calls-for-traditional-values-to-meet-modern-
challenges/
ProZorov, sergei  (2004)  Russian Conservatism in The Putin Presidency: The Dispersion of 
a Hegemonic Discourse. Working Paper 2004/20. Danish Institute for International Studies// C:/
Users/809450/Downloads/RUSSIAN_CONSERVATISM_IN_THE_PUTIN_PRESID%20(1).pdf
Putin, vlAdiMir (1999), “Rossiya na Rubezhe Tysyacheletiy.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Dec. 30.
roseFielde, steven and Bruno dAllAgo (2016). Transformation and Crisis in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Challenges and Prospects. New York, NY Routledge
snegovAyA, MAriA (2014) How Putin’s worldview may be shaping his response in Crimea. 
Monkey Cage, Washington Post, march 2, 2014,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/02/how-putins-worldview-may-be-shaping-his-response-in-crimea/
ZoltAn, siMon (2014) Orban Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy in Hungary. Bloomberg, 
28.07.2014 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-28/orban-says-he-seeks-to-end-
liberal-democracy-in-hungary 
Zevelev, igor (2014) The Russian World Boudaries.Russia’s National Identity Transformation 
and New Foreign Policy Doctrine. Russia in Global Affairs, Moscow, April 
